Talking points (as used)
 Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT,)1970) might be said to aim for a Nuclear Weapon (NW) free world
 Non-Nuclear Weapon (NNW)states parties promise to stay away from Nuclear Weapon
 Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) parties promise to negotiate to do away with Nuclear Weapons
 Poor results on both counts. Worse on disarmament than on stopping a spread.

First on poor nuclear disarmament
 During peak of Cold War 50 000 + NW – most in US & USSR
 After Cold War reduced to 20.000 + still most in US & Russia
 In 2007 four US former statesmen argued NW were obsolete between US/Russia and obsolescent for others. Urged US/Russia
begin the move out of nuclear era or risk that more states – or terrorists — would join. If NW were deemed indispensable to NWS
others would come along…
 Obama (and McCain) agreed: Prague speech, London. Result:
 NPT review 2010 consensus, including Resolution on Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), START
 START reduction agreed level: 1550 deployed strategic NW.
 Since 2010 Disarmament stagnating. Missiles in Europe.

Rearmament in Russia, China, Asia.
 Financial crisis is focus. Disarmament no visibility. Not even Envi.
 New Obama effort 2013. START follow-up. Parallel action?2
 Outlook? Gloomy. Hope US/Russia agree to 1000 NW deployed?
 China, UK and France?… CTBT, FMCT, NATO (200)?
 Strange: what drives rearmament? A pot of 1.800 b $ to skim!
 No big bones of contention between the P5. No WW III!
 Three flashpoints: Taiwan, Indo-Sino border, Kashmir
 US – China potential tensions – but about what?
Regional conflicts: Yes, Africa, Mid East. Will not cause WW III
Secondly, on the risk of a spread of NW to further countries.
 The NPT took account of 5 NWS. Ambition was: no more!
 Well, India, Israel and Pakistan did not join and became NWS
 North Korea withdrew and developed NW
 But Ukraine, Byelorussia & Kazakhstan joined + South Africa
 Iraq and Libya tried develop NW but were stopped
 Today worries about North Korea and Iran.
 Less about terrorist organizations. Can hardly make or deliver?
 The DPRK and IRAN are very different but some common points
 They present threats of NW (and missiles) to others near and far.
 Risk of domino effect. DPRK: RoK. Japan.
 Iran: Saudi. Egypt.
 As in most cases, perceived security may be part of NW interest
 Need convince Iran & DPRK they do not need NW for security.

North Korea
 Economic Sanctions, aid and isolation have not helped. Threats even less.
 Current evolution – risks pushing RoK and Japan to NW. Tensions!
 Strengthened China interest in denuclearizing North Korea. How?
 Despite terrible HR sit, no one wants sudden Northern collapse and

Korean unification.
o China wants a buffer. No US ally at Yalu river!
o Japan does not want an even more formidable competitor (65m)
o RoK – a too costly affair. Cf. Germany. Wants slow motion.

Speculative approach: A regional security arrangement between Beijing
6 – (2 Koreas, Japan and P 3= 6)
North Korea is fixated on US ‘hostility’. (Korean war)
Hence: Offer peace treaty & diplomatic relations + economic aid3
(Assumes the military do not feel they must have tension to rule?)
 China, US, Russia would guarantee inviolability of borders
 No regime change but improved HR demanded of DPRK
 North and South Korea would agree to be denuclearized – as in 1992. Neither enrichment nor reprocess. + inspection. Assurance of supply of low enriched nuclear fuel for power reactors
 Japan remains without nuclear weapons.

IRAN
 Some people now say: it is either Iranian bomb or bombing Iran!
 War perspective: disaster. Iran will counter attack. Conflagration?
 Legal objection: War would violate UN Charter. Cf Iraq.

Would not be self-defense against Iranian aggression
There would be no authorization by the UN Security Council.
 In the case of Iraq — eliminate wmd! – that did not exist…
 In the case of Iran – eliminate intentions! – that may not exist…
 Iran is getting ever closer to a weapon option. Yes. But no decision
 Fuse remains short so long as enrichment (and Pu prod) continues
 Danger of war and tension need be reduced. How?
 First approach – E3 – carrots – suspend enrichment and you get
 support to get into WTO, nuclear reactors, investment etc
 Second approach (with US in back-seat) – adds sticks (SC sanctions)
 (Sanctions satisfy the need to look active. Can also have impact…)
 Yes, diplomacy can be strengthened by pressures brought under sanctions – but negotiations can also be undermined.
 If pressures are too strong= humiliation and breed defiance.
 It may be harder to subdue proud states than men.
 Third approach – only sticks (oil embargo) + cyber attacks etc.
 2012 brought much pain. Lost oil revenues.
 Fourth approach: (Alma Ata) some retreat. Search f modus vivendi?
 As far as can be gathered from media:
 Not given up aim to stop all enrichment and Pu etc. but
 Dropping objection to Iran using own 20 % U needed for Triga 4
 Dropping ban on Iran getting gold — for what? Not explained.
 Dropping demand to close Fordow — only durably suspend…
 No change in oil & gas boycott…
 Iran no answer yet. Technical meeting mid March. Alma Ata meeting April…
 Iran possible response? Could declare it has enough 20 % and
 intends to produce no more for a long time
 will continue to let IAEA verify this
 gives no guarantees for the future
 demands more sanction relief than offered
Modus vivendi would be most welcome, but would not remove tensions.
Still risk of break out and domino effects. Israel dissatisfied.
In a follow up to modus vivendi: Any chance of persuading
Iran to forego enrichment etc.?
Not if Iran seeks weapon or insists to be like Japan…BUT (speculation):
Iran does not need self sufficiency in enriched nuclear fuel. One npp.
Assurance of supply from outside could be given. Cf South Korea
 After Iraq war – Iran does not need nuclear weapons f security
(But Iran needs respect and cannot accept humiliation).
 Israel is worried about anyone in the region getting closer to nuclear
 weapon – whether by building res reactors or enrich or other
(Osirak 1981. Syria 2007. Iran 2012…Sustainable strategy? )
 Israel COULD achieve removal of all perceived nuclear dangers
 by doing away with its own NW within a ZONE free of nuclear and other wmd.
 A Helsinki December meeting regarding zone was nixed by US
 (Israel wanted spotlight on Iran enrichment, not on Israeli weapons)
 Let it be held! Of interest to all, including Israel.
 A regional accord:
 All states of the region including Israel & Iran (but not Pakistan) would agree to have no nuclear weapons no stocks of fissile material no enrichment plants or other installations for the production of fissile material
BUT stiff inspection (incl. bilateral…)5
 Parties regional agreement free to do so although NPT allows E and Pu.
 For Israel – painful sacrifice NW and their mystique, but
 would get assurances not only about Iran but about all.
 For Iran — painful sacrifice of investments but not only free from sanctions etc., but would get credit for bringing about end of
Israeli weapons and helping global disarmament.
 For all in the region – rectifying unfairness they feel was created by Israel not joining the NPT but developing NW
(and perhaps a possibility one day to create a MidEastAtom…)
 For Obama and the world – contribute security guarantees but getting significant disarmament.
 If zone cannot be achieved (would take time) all will have to live with modus vivendi.

Middle East WMD free zone. Hans Blix in Brussels 5 November and Amman 12 November 2012

A Middle East Zone free of Weapons of Mass Destruction – the subject of a Helsinki meeting projected for 2012

Some thoughts by Hans Blix

The 2010 Review Conference of the NPT urged that a meeting should be held on the subject of a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East and the meeting is currently projected to take place in Helsinki in 2012. With public attention today riveted on Iran’s nuclear program and only rarely focused on the Israeli nuclear weapons it would be peculiar if a meeting were to be concerned only with „weapons‟ and were to ignore the concern that Iran’s nuclear enrichment program might result in a weapon.

Could not the states in the Middle East – including Israel and Iran – initiate a discussion about a regional agreement under which all states in the region committed themselves not only to be without nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction but also without facilities for the enrichment of uranium or production of plutonium.

Current stalemate in discussions with Iran

It is understandable that at a moment when the Gulf is full of war ships and the air is full of speculation about attacks on Iranian nuclear installations talks aim at limited measures to lower tension. Yet, it would be unwise to focus exclusively on short term measures and neglect thinking about comprehensive approaches – the more so, as the narrow path followed has so far not led to any success. The meetings that have taken place this year between the P5+1 and Iran in Baghdad and Moscow do not seem to have yielded any rapprochement. The P 5+1 seem to have demanded substantial early Iranian concessions on the enrichment issue, while Iran has continued to hold that it will under no circumstances forego its program of enrichment.

Stalemated discussions may be affected by changes in costs and benefits.

Perceiving Iran as intransigent and unreasonable the US and the other Western parties seem unwilling to significantly increase the benefits that Iran would gain from an agreement. Instead, they seek to increase the cost for Iran of no agreement by strengthening and tightening economic sanctions and by not excluding subversive and military action. If the various parties have any conciliatory cards up their sleeves, they might prefer not to put them on the table at this stage.

From the US side there have earlier been some suggestions that after a settlement of the controversy and restoration of confidence enrichment in Iran might be envisaged long term. The Russian government has talked about a „step by step‟ approach. It has not been rejected by Iran, but the steps do not appear to have been defined. There have also been suggestions to build on earlier schemes concerning the supply of 20 % enriched uranium fuel. Recent accusations against Iran for sending weapons to the Assad government of Syria will add a new difficulty in any near term talks between the P5+1 and Iran.

A meeting in Helsinki?

Nevertheless, the governments concerned in the Middle East region and non- governmental institutions in the region must give thought to the subject that the 2010 NPT Review Conference singled out for a meeting – a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction and missiles to deliver them. Some things have already happened relating to this meeting but many issues need to be clarified and agreed before it is to take place. Helsinki has been chosen as the venue and a Finnish diplomat has been appointed „facilitator‟. The date of the conference seems likely to be toward the end of December and the duration contemplated seems to be less than a week.

The list of participants and the agenda need be agreed in advance or else these matters could derail the conference at the outset. As we know from agreements about other weapon free zones, it is above all the countries that form the region and that are ready to make commitments that should be present. In the case of the Middle East, the selection of most candidates for participation will not raise questions. In some cases there may be discussion.

Turkey has not traditionally been seen as a part of the Middle East. Yet, as a state aspiring to use nuclear power and with significant influence in the area its active participation in the conference – and potentially in a zone – could be practically important. Its membership in the NATO alliance could be a complicating factor. A possible zone commitment to be free of nuclear weapons would hardly be incompatible with NATO guarantees of protection against nuclear attacks („nuclear umbrella). Even though the hosting of nuclear weapons under NATO has not been judged incompatible with the obligations under the NPT, the hosting of such weapons in a nuclear weapon free zone would be a different matter. The idea of moving all NATO nuclear weapons to US territory has been under discussion within the alliance.

However, it seems currently to be shelved.

It may have appeared almost axiomatic that the meeting requested by the 2010 NPT Review Conference would have to have the participation of both Iran and Israel. It is true that a zone agreement that either of these countries refused to join would have limited meaning and would probably not be made. However, this is not the same as saying that the absence of one or both of these states at the meeting now projected would deprive it of meaning. Indeed, making the convocation of the meeting dependent upon their participation would be to make it hostage to conditions that either of them could advance. It might be wiser for the states that are ready to meet, to do so and exchange ideas about concepts and features that they consider possible and desirable. It could be left to states that might have chosen to stay outside the meeting to consider under what conditions they might join further sessions that might be scheduled.

At the present time it is not known whether Israel and Iran are ready to participate in a meeting in 2012. At a juncture when the Israeli government wants to create the impression of a readiness to launch an armed attack against Iran a positive response might look like a conciliatory step and therefore seems unlikely.

For the Iranian government logic might suggest a positive response, given that Iran does not have nuclear weapons, that it sees the possession of nuclear weapons as incompatible with its religious faith and principles and that it has a declared positive attitude to global nuclear disarmament.

The absence of either Israel or Iran from the conference would have some significant drawbacks but could also eliminate road blocks. It might be assumed that Israel would argue that only confidence flowing from a Middle East peace agreement would make a zone viable, while Iran might argue that nuclear fuel cycle activities permitted under the NPT should not be discussed. Neither posture would help the search for early accommodation and compromise.

Whatever the participation in the Helsinki conference, it would seem important that likeminded regional states that do not have the strong vested interests that characterize Israel and Iran get together and define on what lines they think the zone should be built – taking into reasonable account the interest of Israel and Iran as they see them and understand them. While initiatives and pressures by outsiders might well be negatively perceived, regional states that neither have nuclear weapons nor fuel cycle activities might stand a somewhat better chance of finding lines that are acceptable to themselves and take into account the security and other interests of all in the region. The Gulf States and the Gulf States Council could be well placed to take on this delicate task before, during and after a Helsinki conference.

It has been rightly noted by many commentators that the conference in Helsinki should not be seen as a onetime event. Indeed, it is likely to be convoked for a rather short period of time – perhaps a week or even less. This would hardly be more than what is needed for the launching of some ideas and agreement to explore them in further meetings.

What concept of a zone free of nuclear weapons (leaving for the moment the other wmd and missiles aside) could be contemplated?

We do not start with a blank page. The idea of a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East was advanced by Iran and Egypt in 1974 in the General Assembly of the UN. It has been on the table since then and even had consensus support. Originally, the zone concept was clearly rooted in the view that Israel should be brought into the wave of regional states that renounced nuclear weapons. While registering its support for the concept, Israel has always stated that such a zone can only materialize when peace has been established in the region.

Like the NPT zonal treaties – as we know them – aim at eliminating nuclear weapons. However, while they need to be compatible with the NPT they may differ from that treaty in several respects, apart from the geographical limitation. For instance, the NPT becomes binding for each state as it adheres, irrespective of what other states do. All Arab states and Iran and Turkey have adhered to the NPT and are bound by it, but Israel has not adhered, is not bound by it and is assumed to have many nuclear weapons.

The entry into force of a zonal treaty may – as in the case of the Tlatelolco Treaty – be made dependent upon all parties in a specific geographic region adhering. It may also contain many different features that do not figure in the NPT. It may have systems of verification that differ from or go beyond NPT type IAEA inspection, for instance, allowing parties challenge inspections, allowing national inspectors to participate in the verification process etc. A zone treaty could also create a legal basis for active cooperation (MidEastAtom?) in the development and use of nuclear energy, for instance regarding jointly owned nuclear reactors for the generation of power or the desalination of water or for the disposal sites for nuclear waste.

Non-proliferation and the nuclear fuel cycle

While the zonal treaty for the Middle East has been on the international agenda for a long time, what has lately given it much attention has less to do with Israel’s weapons than with the concern that Iran is developing a fuel cycle program, including the construction and operation of plants for the enrichment of uranium. Although Iran, itself, denies any intention to make nuclear weapons, many suspect that this is the intention. Whatever the reality, the program is making Iran a „near nuclear weapon state‟ and it is feared that other states in the region might emulate Iran’s example, which would further raise tensions in the region

.

It is true, as often stressed by Iran that the NPT raises no obstacles to states that want to build fuel cycle installations – such as enrichment plants – for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Japan that had over 50 nuclear power plants operating has both enrichment and reprocessing plants linked to its large peaceful nuclear power capacity. Brazil with only a few nuclear power plants has also developed a capacity to enrich uranium. Unlike Iran, neither Japan, nor Brazil has met international objections.

It is clear that there would be little support in the international community for any international agreement – whether in the shape of a separate convention or an amendment to the NPT – under which states would renounce enrichment or reprocessing activities (perhaps for a specific period of time) in the interest of avoiding that any one becomes a „near nuclear weapon state‟. States like Canada, Australia, Namibia, South Africa or Jordan with large uranium ore resources might want at least to keep the option open of not only mining the raw material but also of enriching it for export sales.

At the same time there is understandable skepticism against a wide-spread construction of fuel cycle installations in the world, especially as the global capacity for enrichment and reprocessing seems ample to respond to needs expected in the near future. Every petrol consuming nation does not need anoil refinery of its own and every state that uses uranium as fuel for nuclear power reactors does not need an enrichment plant of its own.

It is also clear that enrichment – or reprocessing – plants in sensitive regions may be likely to raise concern and even suspicion. The NPT that in principle leaves states freedom to develop capacities for enrichment and reprocessing does not oblige them to use this freedom. They can – if they wish – commit themselves to limitations on it for longer or shorter periods of time. Thus, Undoubtedly with a view to creating mutual confidence, North and South Korea agreed in their Denuclearization Declaration of 1991 to forego the construction both of enrichment and reprocessing plants. The declaration may no longer have legal relevance, but it provides an interesting precedent: states can agree between themselves to renounce some activities (in this case enrichment) that are open to them and that could be misused. They are obviously free to make any such agreement without any time limitation or for a specified period of time. Although the parties alone will be bound by such an agreement, they may feel a need for guarantees from third states regarding the supply of fuel for nuclear power plants that they operate.

The Middle East and the nuclear fuel cycle

States in the Middle East region might find it worth considering whether there would be benefit in agreeing on a zone free not only of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and missiles but also of fuel cycle activities – notably enrichment and reprocessing plants.

Iran might initially respond that nothing could move the country from exercising its right under the NPT to make the full use of nuclear energy, including the right to a programme for the enrichment of uranium. It is true that Iran does not seem to have been tempted to abandon enrichment by offers of investments, support to become a member of the World Trade Organization, assistance to expand its civilian nuclear power program, confirmation of the protection against armed attacks etc. The outside world has had and still has difficulty in understanding this rigid attachment to a programme that can hardly be economic and that can hardly ensure long term nuclear fuel independence. While many conclude that the ultimate aim of the program is to make a nuclear weapon or at least to make Iran a near nuclear weapon state, another explanation for the rigid position could be that continuation of the programme is above all a matter of national pride.

At the non-governmental level some experts starting from the premise that nothing could move Iran to abandon the enrichment program, have suggested acceptance of Iranian enrichment with maximum transparency, international inspection and perhaps international participation. While such arrangements could give reasonably early warning in case of an Iranian break out, it could not physically prevent it. Inspectors could be thrown out and installations could be nationalized. While certainly not without value there would be limitations in the confidence that could flow from such an arrangement. It might not be enough to discourage enrichment programs among neighbors.

A zone free of both nuclear weapons and fuel cycle installations A zonal agreement under which Iran would commit itself to completely suspend its program for the enrichment of uranium (and other fuel cycle services) for a specific, rather long period of time, under which other states in the region would commit themselves to forego enrichment for the same period and under which Israel would commit itself to do away with its nuclear weapons, stocks of fissionable material and production capacity, might be a different matter. It would fit into Iran’s declared wish to promote nuclear disarmament. Having been accused of being a country that threatens the non-proliferation regime and that deserves isolation Iran would get the credit for helping to consolidate non-proliferation in the region and even helping to bring tangible and long sought nuclear disarmament.

Israel would undoubtedly initially reject any suggestion that would remove a nuclear capacity that it has regarded as a life insurance. Israel’s ambition to remain the only de facto nuclear weapon state in the region has been displayed through the attack on Osiraq in 1981, the attack in 2007 on Syrian installations and by the threat of attacks on Iranian installations. Is this line of action deemed sustainable or is it possible that Israel could conclude that it might better for its security, if the country took the cost of doing away with its own – not acknowledged – nuclear weapons and capacity to make such weapons and gained the benefit that no other states in the region would become even a near nuclear weapon state?

There can be no illusions about the difficulties that would have to be solved in designing and getting agreement about a zone as suggested above. However, the difficulties might be even greater in the construction of a zone renouncing only the weapons – leaving the fuel cycle untouched. It is implausible that Israel would go along with eliminating its nuclear weapons and leave Iranian enrichment untouched.

Many problems would have to be overcome. The supply of uranium fuel required for non-weapons related activities like power plants would have to be assured and guaranteed from the outside world. Arrangements for effective inspection going beyond IAEA safeguards would have to be drawn up. Security guarantees might be needed. Steps by P 5 states toward nuclear disarmament would facilitate regional action. The exact geographical scope of a zone would need to be defined.

“Weapons” are the explicit object of discussion at the projected Helsinki meeting. The Chemical Weapons Convention has a definition of chemical weapons, but the NPT does not define nuclear weapons. It should be made clear that not only deployed nuclear weapons, but also non-deployed weapons, weapons ready material and installations to make the material can be covered in a zone agreement. It would seem politically inconceivable at the present time to focus on Israel’s nuclear weapons and forget Iran’s enrichment, and it would seem equally impossible to consider Iran’s growing enrichment and near nuclear weapon status and forgetting that Israel has hundreds of nuclear war heads.

Middle East WMD free zone. Hans Blix in Brussels 5 Nov and Amman 12
Nov 2012

A Middle East Zone free of Weapons of Mass Destruction – the subject
of a Helsinki meeting projected for 2012

Some thoughts by Hans Blix

The 2010 Review Conference of the NPT urged that a meeting should be
held on the subject of a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the
Middle East and the meeting is currently projected to take place in Helsinki
in 2012. With public attention today riveted on Iran‟s nuclear program and
only rarely focused on the Israeli nuclear weapons it would be peculiar if a
meeting were to be concerned only with „weapons‟ and were to ignore the
concern that Iran‟s nuclear enrichment program might result in a weapon.

Could not the states in the Middle East – including Israel and Iran – initiate a
discussion about a regional agreement under which all states in the region
committed themselves not only to be without nuclear and other weapons of
mass destruction but also without facilities for the enrichment of uranium or
production of plutonium.

Current stalemate in discussions with Iran

It is understandable that at a moment when the Gulf is full of war ships and
the air is full of speculation about attacks on Iranian nuclear installations
talks aim at limited measures to lower tension. Yet, it would be unwise to
focus exclusively on short term measures and neglect thinking about
comprehensive approaches – the more so, as the narrow path followed has so
far not led to any success. The meetings that have taken place this year
between the P5+1 and Iran in Baghdad and Moscow do not seem to have
yielded any rapprochement. The P 5+1 seem to have demanded substantial
early Iranian concessions on the enrichment issue, while Iran has continued
to hold that it will under no circumstances forego its program of enrichment.

Stalemated discussions may be affected by changes in costs and benefits.
Perceiving Iran as intransigent and unreasonable the US and the other
Western parties seem unwilling to significantly increase the benefits that
Iran would gain from an agreement. Instead, they seek to increase he cost
for Iran of no agreement by strengthening and tightening economic sanctions

and by not excluding subversive and military action. If the various parties
have any conciliatory cards up their sleeves, they might prefer not to put
them on the table at this stage.

From the US side there have earlier been some suggestions that after a
settlement of the controversy and restoration of confidence enrichment in
Iran might be envisaged long term. The Russian government has talked
about a „step by step‟ approach. It has not been rejected by Iran, but the steps
do not appear to have been defined. There have also been suggestions to
build on earlier schemes concerning the supply of 20 % enriched uranium
fuel. Recent accusations against Iran for sending weapons to the Assad
government of Syria will add a new difficulty in any near term talks between
the P5+1 and Iran.

A meeting in Helsinki?

Nevertheless, the governments concerned in the Middle East region and non-
governmental institutions in the region must give thought to the subject that
the 2010 NPT Review Conference singled out for a meeting – a Middle East
zone free of weapons of mass destruction and missiles to deliver them. Some
things have already happened relating to this meeting but many issues need
to be clarified and agreed before it is to take place. Helsinki has been chosen
as the venue and a Finnish diplomat has been appointed „facilitator‟. The
date of the conference seems likely to be toward the end of December and
the duration contemplated seems to be less than a week.

The list of participants and the agenda need be agreed in advance or else
these matters could derail the conference at the outset. As we know from
agreements about other weapon free zones, it is above all the countries that
form the region and that are ready to make commitments that should be
present. In the case of the Middle East, the selection of most candidates for
participation will not raise questions. In some cases there may be discussion.

Turkey has not traditionally been seen as a part of the Middle East. Yet, as a
state aspiring to use nuclear power and with significant influence in the area
its active participation in the conference – and potentially in a zone — could
be practically important. Its membership in the NATO alliance could be a
complicating factor. A possible zone commitment to be free of nuclear
weapons would hardly be incompatible with NATO guarantees of protection
against nuclear attacks („nuclear umbrella). Even though the hosting of

nuclear weapons under NATO has not been judged incompatible with the
obligations under the NPT, the hosting of such weapons in a nuclear weapon
free zone would be a different matter. The idea of moving all NATO nuclear
weapons to US territory has been under discussion within the alliance.
However, it seems currently to be shelved.

It may have appeared almost axiomatic that the meeting requested by the
2010 NPT Review Conference would have to have the participation of both
Iran and Israel. It is true that a zone agreement that either of these countries
refused to join would have limited meaning and would probably not be
made. However, this is not the same as saying that the absence of one or
both of these states at the meeting now projected would deprive it of
meaning. Indeed, making the convocation of the meeting dependent upon
their participation would be to make it hostage to conditions that either of
them could advance. It might be wiser for the states that are ready to meet, to
do so and exchange ideas about concepts and features that they consider
possible and desirable. It could be left to states that might have chosen to
stay outside the meeting to consider under what conditions they might join
further sessions that might be scheduled.

At the present time it is not known whether Israel and Iran are ready to
participate in a meeting in 2012. At a juncture when the Israeli government
wants to create the impression of a readiness to launch an armed attack
against Iran a positive response might look like a conciliatory step and
therefore seems unlikely.

For the Iranian government logic might suggest a positive response, given
that Iran does not have nuclear weapons, that it sees the possession of
nuclear weapons as incompatible with its religious faith and principles and
that it has a declared positive attitude to global nuclear disarmament.

The absence of either Israel or Iran from the conference would have some
significant drawbacks but could also eliminate road blocks. It might be
assumed that Israel would argue that only confidence flowing from a Middle
East peace agreement would make a zone viable, while Iran might argue that
nuclear fuel cycle activities permitted under the NPT should not be
discussed. Neither posture would help the search for early accommodation
and compromise.

Whatever the participation in the Helsinki conference, it would seem
important that likeminded regional states that do not have the strong vested
interests that characterize Israel and Iran get together and define on what
lines they think the zone should be built – taking into reasonable account the
interest of Israel and Iran as they see them and understand them. While
initiatives and pressures by outsiders might well be negatively perceived,
regional states that neither have nuclear weapons nor fuel cycle activities
might stand a somewhat better chance of finding lines that are acceptable to
themselves and take into account the security and other interests of all in the
region. The Gulf States and the Gulf States Council could be well placed to
take on this delicate task before, during and after a Helsinki conference.

It has been rightly noted by many commentators that the conference in
Helsinki should not be seen as a one time event. Indeed, it is likely to be
convoked for a rather short period of time – perhaps a week or even less.
This would hardly be more than what is needed for the launching of some
ideas and agreement to explore them in further meetings.

What concept of a zone free of nuclear weapons (leaving for the moment the
other wmd and missiles aside) could be contemplated?

We do not start with a blank page. The idea of a nuclear weapon free zone in
the Middle East was advanced by Iran and Egypt in 1974 in the General
Assembly of the UN. It has been on the table since then and even had
consensus support. Originally, the zone concept was clearly rooted in the
view that Israel should be brought into the wave of regional states that
renounced nuclear weapons. While registering its support for the concept,
Israel has always stated that such a zone can only materialize when peace
has been established in the region.

Like the NPT zonal treaties – as we know them – aim at eliminating nuclear
weapons. However, while they need to be compatible with the NPT they
may differ from that treaty in several respects, apart from the geographical
limitation. For instance, the NPT becomes binding for each state as it
adheres, irrespective of what other states do. All Arab states and Iran and
Turkey have adhered to the NPT and are bound by it, but Israel has not
adhered, is not bound by it and is assumed to have many nuclear weapons.

The entry into force of a zonal treaty may – as in the case of the Tlatelolco
Treaty – be made dependent upon all parties in a specific geographic region

adhering. It may also contain many different features that do not figure in
the NPT. It may have systems of verification that differ from or go beyond
NPT type IAEA inspection, for instance, allowing parties challenge
inspections, allowing national inspectors to participate in the verification
process etc. A zone treaty could also create a legal basis for active
cooperation (MidEastAtom?) in the development and use of nuclear energy,
for instance regarding jointly owned nuclear reactors for the generation of
power or the desalination of water or for the disposal sites for nuclear waste.

Non-proliferation and the nuclear fuel cycle

While the zonal treaty for the Middle East has been on the international
agenda for a long time, what has lately given it much attention has less to do
with Israel‟s weapons than with the concern that Iran is developing a fuel
cycle program, including the construction and operation of plants for the
enrichment of uranium. Although Iran, itself, denies any intention to make
nuclear weapons, many suspect that this is the intention. Whatever the
reality, the program is making Iran a „near nuclear weapon state‟ and it is
feared that other states in the region might emulate Iran‟s example, which
would further raise tensions in the region
.
It is true, as often stressed by Iran that the NPT raises no obstacles to states
that want to build fuel cycle installations – such as enrichment plants – for
the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Japan that had over 50 nuclear power
plants operating has both enrichment and reprocessing plants linked to its
large peaceful nuclear power capacity. Brazil with only a few nuclear power
plants has also developed a capacity to enrich uranium. Unlike Iran, neither
Japan, nor Brazil has met international objections.

It is clear that there would be little support in the international community
for any international agreement – whether in the shape of a separate
convention or an amendment to the NPT – under which states would
renounce enrichment or reprocessing activities (perhaps for a specific period
of time) in the interest of avoiding that any one becomes a „near nuclear
weapon state‟. States like Canada, Australia, Namibia, South Africa or
Jordan with large uranium ore resources might want at least to keep the
option open of not only mining the raw material but also of enriching it for
export sales.

At the same time there is understandable skepticism against a wide-spread
construction of fuel cycle installations in the world, especially as the global
capacity for enrichment and reprocessing seems ample to respond to needs
expected in the near future. Every petrol consuming nation does not need an
oil refinery of its own and every state that uses uranium as fuel for nuclear
power reactors does not need an enrichment plant of its own.

It is also clear that enrichment – or reprocessing – plants in sensitive regions
may be likely to raise concern and even suspicion. The NPT that in principle
leaves states freedom to develop capacities for enrichment and reprocessing
does not oblige them to use this freedom. They can – if they wish – commit
themselves to limitations on it for longer or shorter periods of time. Thus,
Undoubtedly with a view to creating mutual confidence, North and South
Korea agreed in their Denuclearization Declaration of 1991 to forego the
construction both of enrichment and reprocessing plants. The declaration
may no longer have legal relevance, but it provides an interesting precedent:
states can agree between themselves to renounce some activities (in this case
enrichment) that are open to them and that could be misused. They are
obviously free to make any such agreement without any time limitation or
for a specified period of time. Although the parties alone will be bound by
such an agreement, they may feel a need for guarantees from third states
regarding the supply of fuel for nuclear power plants that they operate.

The Middle East and the nuclear fuel cycle

States in the Middle East region might find it worth considering whether
there would be benefit in agreeing on a zone free not only of nuclear and
other weapons of mass destruction and missiles but also of fuel cycle
activities – notably enrichment and reprocessing plants.

Iran might initially respond that nothing could move the country from
exercising its right under the NPT to make the full use of nuclear energy,
including the right to a programme for the enrichment of uranium. It is true
that Iran does not seem to have been tempted to abandon enrichment by
offers of investments, support to become a member of the World Trade
Organization, assistance to expand its civilian nuclear power program,
confirmation of the protection against armed attacks etc. The outside world
has had and still has difficulty in understanding this rigid attachment to a
programme that can hardly be economic and that can hardly ensure long
term nuclear fuel independence. While many conclude that the ultimate aim

of the program is to make a nuclear weapon or at least to make Iran a near
nuclear weapon state, another explanation for the rigid position could be that
continuation of the programme is above all a matter of national pride.

At the non-governmental level some experts starting from the premise that
nothing could move Iran to abandon the enrichment program, have
suggested acceptance of Iranian enrichment with maximum transparency,
international inspection and perhaps international participation. While such
arrangements could give reasonably early warning in case of an Iranian
break out, it could not physically prevent it. Inspectors could be thrown out
and installations could be nationalized. While certainly not without value
there would be limitations in the confidence that could flow from such an
arrangement. It might not be enough to discourage enrichment programs
among neighbors.

A zone free of both nuclear weapons and fuel cycle installations

A zonal agreement under which Iran would commit itself to completely
suspend its program for the enrichment of uranium (and other fuel cycle
services) for a specific, rather long period of time, under which other states
in the region would commit themselves to forego enrichment for the same
period and under which Israel would commit itself to do away with its
nuclear weapons, stocks of fissionable material and production capacity,
might be a different matter. It would fit into Iran‟s declared wish to promote
nuclear disarmament. Having been accused of being a country that threatens
the non-proliferation regime and that deserves isolation Iran would get the
credit for helping to consolidate non-proliferation in the region and even
helping to bring tangible and long sought nuclear disarmament.

Israel would undoubtedly initially reject any suggestion that would remove a
nuclear capacity that it has regarded as a life insurance. Israel‟s ambition to
remain the only de facto nuclear weapon state in the region has been
displayed through the attack on Osiraq in 1981, the attack in 2007 on Syrian
installations and by the threat of attacks on Iranian installations. Is this line
of action deemed sustainable or is it possible that Israel could conclude that
it might better for its security, if the country took the cost of doing away
with its own – not acknowledged – nuclear weapons and capacity to make
such weapons and gained the benefit that no other states in the region would
become even a near nuclear weapon state?

There can be no illusions about the difficulties that would have to be solved
in designing and getting agreement about a zone as suggested above.
However, the difficulties might be even greater in the construction of a zone
renouncing only the weapons – leaving the fuel cycle untouched. It is
implausible that Israel would go along with eliminating its nuclear weapons
and leave Iranian enrichment untouched.

Many problems would have to be overcome. The supply of uranium fuel
required for non-weapons related activities like power plants would have to
be assured and guaranteed from the outside world. Arrangements for
effective inspection going beyond IAEA safeguards would have to be drawn
up. Security guarantees might be needed. Steps by P 5 states toward nuclear
disarmament would facilitate regional action. The exact geographical scope
of a zone would need to be defined.

“Weapons” are the explicit object of discussion at the projected Helsinki
meeting. The Chemical Weapons Convention has a definition of chemical
weapons, but the NPT does not define nuclear weapons. It should be made
clear that not only deployed nuclear weapons, but also non-deployed
weapons, weapons ready material and installations to make the material can
be covered in a zone agreement. It would seem politically inconceivable at
the present time to focus on Israel‟s nuclear weapons and forget Iran‟s
enrichment, and it would seem equally impossible to consider Iran‟s
growing enrichment and near nuclear weapon status and forgetting that
Israel has hundreds of nuclear war heads.

EU Non-Proliferation Consortium Second Seminar to Promote confidence Building and in Support of a process Aimed at Establishing a Zone Free of WMD and Means of delivery In the Middle East.

Today the disarmament train seems to have run out of steam and even be rolling backward. We are discussing a zone free of WMD in the Middle East but governments and media are focusing on the civil war in Syria and considering bombing or not bombing in Iran.

I shall try to describe in a fragmentary way the current sorry context in which our discussion takes place.

First, although the Cold War has been over for more than 20 years and there are no significant controversies between the major powers about borders, territory or ideology, armaments and military budgets are expanding in Russia, China, India and many other countries.

Even countries without any obvious security concerns make big budgetary allocations to buy, say, superexpensive jet fighters.

The latest aggregate sum that I saw for the world’s military expenses was over 1,800 billion dollars – far more in real terms than during the Cold War. It is a pity that the weapons cannot be used to defend the planet against global warming

‘Wer soll das bezahlen?’ Who is to pay? is a good German one liner.

The willingness varies a lot. In Russia, a much respected Minister of Finance, Mr. Kudrin, resigned in the past year complaining, inter alia, about a too big military budget. In Europe the tax payers seem unwilling to accept even 2 % of GDP for the military budgets. In the US, the tax payers already carry more than 40 % of the world’ military expenditures and Governor Romney has urged that 4 % of US GDP should be the norm for the military budget. A victory for him in tomorrow’s election would not augur for a less militarized world.

So much for budgets for armaments. Now to the absence of disarmament.

The only rays of light I can see is progress in New York negotiations about an Arms Trade Agreement and the success of the Seoul conference on nuclear security. The rest is darkness.

At the multilateral level, the Conference on Disarmament has reported another year without agreement even on a work programme. Unemployment is high in many European states. At the CD it is 100 %! An ongoing anomaly.

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty demonstrates another anomaly: It is in operation since many years – but it is not in force. And there is no movement on the ratifications needed from the US, China and some other states. To stimulate ratifications perhaps Iran could offer to ratify – on condition that the US and Israel do the same?

Negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty has continued to be blocked in the CD.

The tactical nuclear weapons of NATO in Europe that have been reported to be militarily useless and that we thought could be plucked like low hanging disarmament fruits, are retained and might even be modernized.

In the US, where the Obama administration had wanted to reset relations with Russia resistance to the ratification of START was stiff and support remains strong for a continued expansion of NATO and missile defenses in Europe — all raising Russian skepticism to further nuclear disarmament.

In Asia, the six power talks in Beijing are in limbo and have failed to persuade the DPRK to eliminate its nuclear weapons and to join a regional order that would give it recognition, guarantees of security and economic development. Much is at stake.

More nuclear and missile tests by North Korea could inspire some in Japan and even South Korea to feel doubt about the validity of their adherence to nuclear non-proliferation. I trust the

Government in Beijing is fully aware of this.

In Asia, differences over islands and seas spiced with fierce nationalist feelings risk to create a dangerous brew that could boil over and jeopardize the Asian boom, unless all recognize their interdependence and exercise restraint. They would do well to use the International Court of Justice or arbitration or other kinds of third party determination to settle their differences..

Perhaps above all the US and China need to recognize their interdependence and exercise restraint, lest the potential tension between them over influence in the Pacific and Asia translate into more than the present strengthening of navies and lively military body language.

Before I proceed and get to the Middle East let me ask where as Europeans and as citizens of the world we seek guidance in our efforts to prevent the use of armed force and, in particular the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

The European Security Strategy of 2003 tells us that the “fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations Charter.”

It needs to be said because it was by no means accepted everywhere in 2003, when Iraq was attacked, nor, it seems, is it now. Some may see respect for non-proliferation as more important than respect for the UN Charter.

I think we should recognize that the Charter was a leap forward for the world society and support and respect it. In Africa, and the Middle East thanks to a dynamic reading of the UN Charter many peace keeping and some peace enforcement operations have been launched by decisions of the Security Council – some very successful, others less so.

Perhaps it was the failure of the UN to intervene against the genocide in Rwanda that prompted the organization to adopt the R2P– the right to protection – that calls for UN action to protect human lives and rights, when they are attacked or endangered within states that fail in their duty of protection.

We saw in the case of Libya how the Security Council authorized action that came to comprise the use of armed force to protect a civilian population attacked by its government. Today, when the horror and tragedy of the civil war in Syria is before our eyes many would wish to see a similar UN authorized armed humanitarian intervention. I see little likelihood, however, that the Security Council would authorize one. After Afghanistan and Iraq there is an – on the whole healthy – reluctance to ‘send boots on the ground’ on a large scale for fighting missions. Even when initially successful, large armed interventions in internal orders risk becoming long and difficult engagements. As Colin Powell is reputed to have said: ‘If you break it, you own it…’

This seminar has spent the day examining the issue of a zone free of WMD and missiles in the Middle East. I shall limit myself to a few points.

First, the major rationale behind the zone concept has been to seek an arrangement under which all states in the zone, including Israel, could live without making and possessing nuclear weapons. I think it would be surrealistic if Israel’s nuclear weapons were not in the minds of participants at a conference considering a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction. As we have been reminded by Nabil Fahmy these weapons were the main background of the resolution that saved the NPT in 1995.

Second, in my view it would be equally surrealistic if, at a time when the world is absorbed by concerns that Iran might be moving to make a nuclear weapons, such a conference were to ignore the issue of uranium enrichment in Iran.

In a background paper that I have submitted to this seminar, I express the view that Israel, Iran, all states in the Middle East and the world at large would gain tremendously, if the states of the region took the initiative and agreed on a zone. It would have to ensure the elimination and well verified absence of all weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear and chemical and the dismantling of installations for their production as well as plants devoted to sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle, such as the enrichment of uranium and the production of plutonium.

It is true that the NPT allows enrichment and reprocessing for peaceful purposes, but it does not oblige parties to engage in these processes.

Individual states and regions are perfectly free to agree to renounce such activities for determined periods of time.

I am sure these ideas may look surrealistic – or at least not realistic – to some who will say that both Israel and Iran would reject them. This is what encourages me to think that the ideas are on the right track – perhaps a rather long track.

I wish those who are on a much shorter tracks well. However, I believe humiliation is not a good way to overcome defiance – or anything else for that matter and I feel strongly opposed to the pursuit of non-proliferation by bombing. The idea of ‘bombing the bomb’ is not followed regarding North Korea and should not be followed elsewhere.

It seems broadly agreed that all available peaceful means must be applied to induce Iran to agree to abandon, suspend or at least somehow to limit its enrichment of uranium. We do not hear much, however, about what is offered as inducement. What we hear is mostly talk about the suspension of ‘crippling sanctions’, In the past, we heard about security guarantees, support for entry into the WTO, support for the expansion of civilian nuclear power etc. Are such items no longer on the table? And has anyone asked if Iran would accept a zone excluding both nuclear bombs and the enrichment of uranium?

While recognizing the seriousness of the current controversy I find it puzzling that after the broad international criticism and condemnation of the attack on Iraq in 2003 as a violation of the UN Charter governments now seem to intensely discuss whether Iran has violated the NPT but not whether attacks on Iranian nuclear installations without UN authorization would violate the UN Charter. I have noted only one exception. According to the Guardian, the UK Attorney-General has stated in a memo that a preemptive strike could violate international law. I hope he sticks to it.

We know that armed attacks would not be authorized in the Security Council and I am sure that — but for aggression by Iran — a strong majority in the General Assembly would be opposed to any such authorization. Attacks on Iran could also not be construed as self defense against any Iranian aggression. At least so far none has been committed or even appeared imminent. As for threats, those that have been directed to Iran would seem to have been much more specific than those that have come from Iranian leaders.

Let me conclude by turning to EUROPE and end on a positive note.

First, I cannot imagine that despite the rhetoric any European state would join in a military attack on Iran, except in the unlikely case that the Security Council authorized one or that Iran committed armed aggression. My guess is that the rhetoric deployed against Iran probably does more to stimulate defiance of Western states than compliance with Security Council demands.

Second, the E.U. should continue to develop détente and good neighborly relations with Russia. We have no reason to doubt Russia’s wish to reciprocate. We must find a solution to the missile deployments that are claimed to defend against Iran but whose first impact has been to offend Russia. We should move on to find ways on both sides to end the obsolete deployment of tactical nuclear weapons and to find ways of modernizing the treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE) that once brought this continent significant disarmament. Lastly, we should not be mute about our wish to see democracy in forward gear and corruption in reverse in Russia.

Third, and last, building deliberately on their interdependence, European states have come to solid peace and now show no taste for growing military budgets. I think we should cherish this exceptionalism and seek to convince others that the interdependence that is rapidly accelerating with globalization should be welcomed – not least because it calls for restraint and conciliation when differences arise.

A Middle East Zone free of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles for their delivery. Some thoughts by Hans Blix in April 2012 in view of the meeting  planned to take place at Helsinki in 2012.

• At this time – April 2012 – the question relating to the Iranian program for the enrichment of uranium is so hot that a discussion of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East may seem like distant dreaming.  A meeting between Iran and the P5+1 (or EU3+3) is  expected later this month and it must be hoped that it will bring some easing of the acute tension and less talk of possible military action. Considering the rigid postures the meeting can hardly be expected to bring drastic rapprochement. While declaring that it is ready to discuss the ‘nuclear issue’ Iran continues to hold that it will under no circumstances forego its program of enrichment. Some of the P 5  on the other hand, keep repeating that a ‘window of opportunity’ remains open for Iran only for a short while more, suggesting that they demand substantial early Iranian concessions on the enrichment issue while not  describing any concessions they would be ready to make.

• Positions are often rigid in advance of meetings. If on this occasion the various parties have any conciliatory cards, they might prefer to keep them up their sleeves at this stage. From the US side there have only been some suggestions that after a settlement of the controversy and restoration of confidence enrichment in Iran might be envisaged long term. The Russian government has talked about a ‘step by step’ approach. It has not been rejected by Iran, but the steps do not appear to have been defined. There have also been suggestions to build on earlier schemes concerning the supply of 20 % enriched uranium fuel.

• Whatever may happen in the controversy in the near future it is incumbent upon the governments concerned in the Middle East region and non-governmental institutions in the region to give thought to the subject that the 2010 NPT Review Conference singled out for a meeting – a Middle East Zone free of weapons of mass destruction and missiles to deliver them.

• Some things have already happened relating to this conference but many issues need to be clarified and agreed before the meeting.  Helsinki has been chosen as the venue and a Finnish diplomat has been appointed ‘facilitator’. The date of the conference seems likely to be toward the end of December.

• The list of participants and the agenda need be agreed in advance or else these matters could derail the conference at the outset. As we know from agreements about other weapon free zones, it is above all the countries that form the region and that are ready to make commitments that should be present. In the case of the Middle East, the selection of most candidates for participation will not raise questions. In some cases there may be discussion.

• Turkey has not traditionally been seen as a part of the Middle East. Yet, as a state aspiring to use nuclear power and with significant influence in the area its active participation in the conference – and potentially in a zone — could be practically important. Its membership in the NATO alliance could be a complicating factor. A possible zone commitment to be free of nuclear weapons would hardly be incompatible with NATO guarantees of protection against nuclear attacks (‘nuclear umbrella). Even though the hosting of nuclear weapons under NATO has not been judged incompatible with the obligations under the NPT the hosting of such weapons in a nuclear weapon free zone could be a different matter. The idea of moving all NATO nuclear weapons to US territory is under active discussion within the alliance but no decision has yet been taken on the issue.

• To most observers and commentators it has been almost axiomatic that the meeting demanded by the 2010 NPT Review Conference must have the participation of both Iran and Israel. It is true that a zone agreement in which either of these countries is missing would have limited meaning. However, this is not the same as saying that the absence of one or both of these states at the meeting would deprive it of meaning. Indeed, making the holding the meeting dependent upon their participation would be to make it hostage to conditions that either of them could advance. It might be wiser for the states that are prima facie interested  in and positive to creating a zone agree to meet and consider lines of agreement that they consider possible and desirable, leaving it to relevant states that might have chosen to stay outside the meeting to consider under what conditions or with what modification they might join the project.

• At the present time it is not known whether Israel and Iran are ready to participate in the meeting. In the case of Israel a positive response might look like a conciliatory gesture in the controversy with Iran and this would hardly be consistent with the impression that the Israeli government wants to create of a readiness to launch an armed attack against Iran. In the case of Iran, declining participation in the conference would seem difficult, considering that Iran does not have nuclear weapons, that it declares a strongly positive attitude to global nuclear disarmament and sees the possession of nuclear weapons as  incompatible with its religious faith and principles. Iran would, indeed, have a chance to take the high moral ground and propose a zone in which all states in the region, including Iran itself and Israel, renounced both weapons and fuel cycle activities and highly effective inspection. However. Iran might not take this chance. It could even decline participation, if Israel were to stay away or if the agenda were to open for discussion of zonal conditions demanding the absence not only of deployable weapons but also of stocks of fissile material and installations for the production of such material.

• The absence of either Israel or Iran from the conference would have some significant drawbacks but would also eliminate road blocks. It might be assumed that in any negotiation of zonal commitments, Israel would strive to make the realization of a zone dependent upon a Middle East peace agreement, while Iran might strive to leave all fuel cycle activities unregulated. Neither posture would help the search for early accommodation and compromise.

• Whatever the participation in the Helsinki conference, it would seem important that likeminded regional states that do not have the strong vested interests that characterize Israel and Iran get together and define on what lines the zone should be built – taking into reasonable account the interest of Israel and Iran as they see them and understand them. While initiatives and pressures by outsiders might well be negatively perceived, regional states that neither have nuclear weapons nor fuel cycle activities might stand a somewhat better chance of finding lines that are acceptable to themselves and take into account the security and other interests of all in the region.

• The Gulf States and the Gulf States Council would be well placed to take on this delicate role that would require intense consultations in the relatively short period before the Helsinki conference, as well as during and after the conference.

• It has been rightly noted by many commentators that the conference in Helsinki should not be seen as a one time event. Indeed, it is likely to be convoked for a rather short period of time – perhaps a week or even less. This would hardly be more than what is needed for the launching of some ideas and agreement to explore them in further meetings.

• What concept of a zone free of nuclear weapons (leaving for the moment the other wmd and missiles aside)  could be contemplated? We do not start with a blank page but must look back.

• The idea of a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East was  advanced by Iran and Egypt in 1974 in the General Assembly of the UN. It has been on the table since then and even had consensus  support.  However, while registering its support Israel has always stated that such a zone can only materialize when peace has been established in the region.

• Originally, the zone concept was clearly rooted in the view that Israel should be brought into the wave of regional states that renounced nuclear weapons.

• Like the NPT a zonal treaty aims at eliminating nuclear items. However, it may differ in several respects from the NPT, apart from the geographical limitation. The NPT becomes binding for each state as it adheres, irrespective of what other states do. All Arab states and Iran and Turkey have adhered to the NPT and are bound by it but Israel has not adhered, is not bound and is assumed to have many nuclear weapons.

• The entry into force for a zonal treaty can – as in the Tlatelolco Treaty – be made dependent upon all parties in a specific geographic region adhering. It can also contain many different features that do not figure in the NPT. It may have systems of verification that differ from or go beyond traditional IAEA inspection, for instance, allow parties challenge inspections, allow national inspectors to participate in the verification process etc.  It could also create a legal basis for active cooperation in the development and use of nuclear energy, for instance regarding jointly owned nuclear reactors for the generation of power or the desalination of water or for the disposal sites for nuclear waste.

• While the zonal treaty for the Middle East has been on the international agenda for a long time, what has lately propelled it into much attention has less to do with Israel’s weapons than with the concern that Iran is developing a fuel cycle program, including the construction and operation of plants for the enrichment of uranium. Although Iran, itself, denies any intention to make nuclear weapons, some suspect that this is the intention. Whatever the reality, the program is making Iran a ‘near nuclear weapon state’ and it is feared that other states in the region may emulate Iran’s example, which will raise the tension.

• It is true, as often underlined by Iran that the NPT raises no obstacles to states that want to build fuel cycle installations for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Japan that had over 50 nuclear power plants operating has both enrichment and reprocessing plants linked to this large peaceful nuclear power capacity. Brazil with only a few nuclear power plants has also developed a capacity to enrich uranium. Unlike Iran neither Japan, nor Brazil have met international objections.

• It is clear that there would be little support in the international community for any international agreement – whether a separate convention or an amendment to the NPT – under which states would renounce enrichment or reprocessing activities (perhaps for a specific period of time) in the interest of avoiding that any one becomes a ‘near nuclear weapon state’. States like Canada, Australia, Namibia,  South Africa or Jordan with large uranium resources ore might want at least to keep the option open of not only mining the energy raw material but also of enriching it for export sales.

• At the same time there is understandable skepticism against a wide-spread  construction of fuel cycle installations in the world, especially as the global capacity for enrichment and reprocessing seems ample to respond to needs expected in the near future. Every petrol consuming nation does not need an oil refinery of its own and every state using uranium as fuel for nuclear power reactors does not need an enrichment plant of its own.

• It is also clear that enrichment – or reprocessing –  plants in sensitive regions or without rigid control and international participation and/or supervision may be likely to raise concern and even suspicion. The NPT that in principle leaves states freedom to develop capacities for enrichment and reprocessing does not oblige them to use this freedom. They can – if they wish – accept limitations on it for longer or shorter periods of time.

• Undoubtedly with a view to creating mutual confidence, North and South Korea agreed in their Denuclearization Declaration of 1991 to forego the construction both of enrichment and reprocessing plants. The declaration may no longer have legal relevance but it provides an interesting precedent: states can agree between themselves to renounce some activities (in this case enrichment) that are open to them and that could be misused. They are obviously free to make them for a specified period of time. Although the legal effects arise only between the parties guarantees might be needed from third states of supply of fuel for nuclear power plants operated by the states.

• It would seem worth considering whether the states in the Middle East region might not find benefit it establishing a zone free not only of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and missiles but also of fuel cycle activities –  notably enrichment and reprocessing plants.

• Iran might initially respond that nothing could move the country from exercising its right under the NPT to make the full use of nuclear energy, including the right to a programme for the enrichment of uranium. It is true that Iran does not seem to have been tempted to abandon enrichment by offers of investments, support to become a member of WTO, assistance to expand its civilian nuclear power program, confirmation of the protection against armed attacks etc. The outside world has had and still has difficulty in understanding this rigid attachment to a programme that can hardly be economic and that can hardly ensure long term nuclear fuel independence. While many conclude that the ultimate aim of the program is to make a nuclear weapon or to make Iran a near nuclear weapon state, another explanation might be that continuation of the programme is more a matter of national pride rather than of assurance of supply of nuclear fuel.

• At the non-governmental level some experts starting from the premise that nothing could move Iran to abandon the enrichment program, have suggested acceptance of Iranian enrichment with maximum transparency, international inspection and perhaps international participation. While such arrangements could give reasonably early warning in case of an Iranian break out, it could not physically prevent it.  Inspectors could be thrown out and installations could be nationalized. While not without value such an arrangement would give the outside world limited confidence and it is not certain that it would be enough to discourage enrichment programs among neighbors.

• A zonal agreement that would oblige Iran to completely suspend its program for enrichment of uranium for a specific, rather long period of time, oblige other states in the region to forego enrichment for the same period and oblige Israel to do away with its nuclear weapons, stocks of fissionable material and production capacity, might be a different matter.  It would fit into Iran’s declared wish to promote nuclear disarmament. Having been accused of threatening non-proliferation and deserving isolation Iran would get the credit for helping to consolidate non-proliferation in the region and even helping to bring tangible and welcome nuclear disarmament.

• Israel would undoubtedly initially reject any suggestion that would remove a nuclear capacity that it regards as a life insurance. Israel’s ambition to remain the only nuclear weapon state in the region has been displayed through the attack on Osirak in 1981, the attack in 2007 on some Syrian installations and by the threat of attacks on Iranian installations. Is this deemed a sustainable approach or is it possible that Israel would consider the cost benefit better if the country took the cost of doing away with its own – not acknowledged – nuclear weapons and capacity to make such weapons and gained the benefit that no other states in the region would become even a near nuclear weapon state?

• There can be no illusions about the difficulties that would have to be solved in designing and getting agreement about a zone as suggested above. However, the difficulties might be even greater in the construction of a zone renouncing only the weapons – leaving the fuel cycle untouched.  It is implausible that Israel would go along with eliminating its nuclear weapons and leave Iranian enrichment untouched.

• Many problems would have to be overcome. The supply of required uranium fuel would have to be assured and guaranteed from the outside world. Arrangements for effective inspection going beyond  IAEA safeguards would have to be drawn up. Security guarantees would be needed. Steps by P 5 states toward nuclear disarmament would facilitate regional action. The exact geographical scope of a zone would need to be defined.

• The explicit object of the Helsinki meeting are ‘weapons’. The CWC has a definition of chemical weapons. The NPT does not define nuclear weapons.  Discussions before Helsinki should make it clear  that not only deployed nuclear weapons, but also non-deployed weapons, weapons ready material and installations to make the material should be covered in a zone agreement. It would seem politically inconceivable at the present time to focus on Israel’s nuclear weapons and forget Iran’s enrichment, and it would seem equally impossible to consider Iran’s growing enrichment and near nuclear weapon status and forgetting that Israel has hundreds of nuclear arms.

Part 1. What has happened to the nuclear disarmament spring?

Part 2. How serious is the threat for nuclear weapon?

Part 3. How to resolve the Iranian nuclear dilemma?