A Middle East Zone free of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles for their delivery. Some thoughts by Hans Blix in April 2012 in view of the meeting  planned to take place at Helsinki in 2012.

• At this time – April 2012 – the question relating to the Iranian program for the enrichment of uranium is so hot that a discussion of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East may seem like distant dreaming.  A meeting between Iran and the P5+1 (or EU3+3) is  expected later this month and it must be hoped that it will bring some easing of the acute tension and less talk of possible military action. Considering the rigid postures the meeting can hardly be expected to bring drastic rapprochement. While declaring that it is ready to discuss the ‘nuclear issue’ Iran continues to hold that it will under no circumstances forego its program of enrichment. Some of the P 5  on the other hand, keep repeating that a ‘window of opportunity’ remains open for Iran only for a short while more, suggesting that they demand substantial early Iranian concessions on the enrichment issue while not  describing any concessions they would be ready to make.

• Positions are often rigid in advance of meetings. If on this occasion the various parties have any conciliatory cards, they might prefer to keep them up their sleeves at this stage. From the US side there have only been some suggestions that after a settlement of the controversy and restoration of confidence enrichment in Iran might be envisaged long term. The Russian government has talked about a ‘step by step’ approach. It has not been rejected by Iran, but the steps do not appear to have been defined. There have also been suggestions to build on earlier schemes concerning the supply of 20 % enriched uranium fuel.

• Whatever may happen in the controversy in the near future it is incumbent upon the governments concerned in the Middle East region and non-governmental institutions in the region to give thought to the subject that the 2010 NPT Review Conference singled out for a meeting – a Middle East Zone free of weapons of mass destruction and missiles to deliver them.

• Some things have already happened relating to this conference but many issues need to be clarified and agreed before the meeting.  Helsinki has been chosen as the venue and a Finnish diplomat has been appointed ‘facilitator’. The date of the conference seems likely to be toward the end of December.

• The list of participants and the agenda need be agreed in advance or else these matters could derail the conference at the outset. As we know from agreements about other weapon free zones, it is above all the countries that form the region and that are ready to make commitments that should be present. In the case of the Middle East, the selection of most candidates for participation will not raise questions. In some cases there may be discussion.

• Turkey has not traditionally been seen as a part of the Middle East. Yet, as a state aspiring to use nuclear power and with significant influence in the area its active participation in the conference – and potentially in a zone — could be practically important. Its membership in the NATO alliance could be a complicating factor. A possible zone commitment to be free of nuclear weapons would hardly be incompatible with NATO guarantees of protection against nuclear attacks (‘nuclear umbrella). Even though the hosting of nuclear weapons under NATO has not been judged incompatible with the obligations under the NPT the hosting of such weapons in a nuclear weapon free zone could be a different matter. The idea of moving all NATO nuclear weapons to US territory is under active discussion within the alliance but no decision has yet been taken on the issue.

• To most observers and commentators it has been almost axiomatic that the meeting demanded by the 2010 NPT Review Conference must have the participation of both Iran and Israel. It is true that a zone agreement in which either of these countries is missing would have limited meaning. However, this is not the same as saying that the absence of one or both of these states at the meeting would deprive it of meaning. Indeed, making the holding the meeting dependent upon their participation would be to make it hostage to conditions that either of them could advance. It might be wiser for the states that are prima facie interested  in and positive to creating a zone agree to meet and consider lines of agreement that they consider possible and desirable, leaving it to relevant states that might have chosen to stay outside the meeting to consider under what conditions or with what modification they might join the project.

• At the present time it is not known whether Israel and Iran are ready to participate in the meeting. In the case of Israel a positive response might look like a conciliatory gesture in the controversy with Iran and this would hardly be consistent with the impression that the Israeli government wants to create of a readiness to launch an armed attack against Iran. In the case of Iran, declining participation in the conference would seem difficult, considering that Iran does not have nuclear weapons, that it declares a strongly positive attitude to global nuclear disarmament and sees the possession of nuclear weapons as  incompatible with its religious faith and principles. Iran would, indeed, have a chance to take the high moral ground and propose a zone in which all states in the region, including Iran itself and Israel, renounced both weapons and fuel cycle activities and highly effective inspection. However. Iran might not take this chance. It could even decline participation, if Israel were to stay away or if the agenda were to open for discussion of zonal conditions demanding the absence not only of deployable weapons but also of stocks of fissile material and installations for the production of such material.

• The absence of either Israel or Iran from the conference would have some significant drawbacks but would also eliminate road blocks. It might be assumed that in any negotiation of zonal commitments, Israel would strive to make the realization of a zone dependent upon a Middle East peace agreement, while Iran might strive to leave all fuel cycle activities unregulated. Neither posture would help the search for early accommodation and compromise.

• Whatever the participation in the Helsinki conference, it would seem important that likeminded regional states that do not have the strong vested interests that characterize Israel and Iran get together and define on what lines the zone should be built – taking into reasonable account the interest of Israel and Iran as they see them and understand them. While initiatives and pressures by outsiders might well be negatively perceived, regional states that neither have nuclear weapons nor fuel cycle activities might stand a somewhat better chance of finding lines that are acceptable to themselves and take into account the security and other interests of all in the region.

• The Gulf States and the Gulf States Council would be well placed to take on this delicate role that would require intense consultations in the relatively short period before the Helsinki conference, as well as during and after the conference.

• It has been rightly noted by many commentators that the conference in Helsinki should not be seen as a one time event. Indeed, it is likely to be convoked for a rather short period of time – perhaps a week or even less. This would hardly be more than what is needed for the launching of some ideas and agreement to explore them in further meetings.

• What concept of a zone free of nuclear weapons (leaving for the moment the other wmd and missiles aside)  could be contemplated? We do not start with a blank page but must look back.

• The idea of a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East was  advanced by Iran and Egypt in 1974 in the General Assembly of the UN. It has been on the table since then and even had consensus  support.  However, while registering its support Israel has always stated that such a zone can only materialize when peace has been established in the region.

• Originally, the zone concept was clearly rooted in the view that Israel should be brought into the wave of regional states that renounced nuclear weapons.

• Like the NPT a zonal treaty aims at eliminating nuclear items. However, it may differ in several respects from the NPT, apart from the geographical limitation. The NPT becomes binding for each state as it adheres, irrespective of what other states do. All Arab states and Iran and Turkey have adhered to the NPT and are bound by it but Israel has not adhered, is not bound and is assumed to have many nuclear weapons.

• The entry into force for a zonal treaty can – as in the Tlatelolco Treaty – be made dependent upon all parties in a specific geographic region adhering. It can also contain many different features that do not figure in the NPT. It may have systems of verification that differ from or go beyond traditional IAEA inspection, for instance, allow parties challenge inspections, allow national inspectors to participate in the verification process etc.  It could also create a legal basis for active cooperation in the development and use of nuclear energy, for instance regarding jointly owned nuclear reactors for the generation of power or the desalination of water or for the disposal sites for nuclear waste.

• While the zonal treaty for the Middle East has been on the international agenda for a long time, what has lately propelled it into much attention has less to do with Israel’s weapons than with the concern that Iran is developing a fuel cycle program, including the construction and operation of plants for the enrichment of uranium. Although Iran, itself, denies any intention to make nuclear weapons, some suspect that this is the intention. Whatever the reality, the program is making Iran a ‘near nuclear weapon state’ and it is feared that other states in the region may emulate Iran’s example, which will raise the tension.

• It is true, as often underlined by Iran that the NPT raises no obstacles to states that want to build fuel cycle installations for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Japan that had over 50 nuclear power plants operating has both enrichment and reprocessing plants linked to this large peaceful nuclear power capacity. Brazil with only a few nuclear power plants has also developed a capacity to enrich uranium. Unlike Iran neither Japan, nor Brazil have met international objections.

• It is clear that there would be little support in the international community for any international agreement – whether a separate convention or an amendment to the NPT – under which states would renounce enrichment or reprocessing activities (perhaps for a specific period of time) in the interest of avoiding that any one becomes a ‘near nuclear weapon state’. States like Canada, Australia, Namibia,  South Africa or Jordan with large uranium resources ore might want at least to keep the option open of not only mining the energy raw material but also of enriching it for export sales.

• At the same time there is understandable skepticism against a wide-spread  construction of fuel cycle installations in the world, especially as the global capacity for enrichment and reprocessing seems ample to respond to needs expected in the near future. Every petrol consuming nation does not need an oil refinery of its own and every state using uranium as fuel for nuclear power reactors does not need an enrichment plant of its own.

• It is also clear that enrichment – or reprocessing –  plants in sensitive regions or without rigid control and international participation and/or supervision may be likely to raise concern and even suspicion. The NPT that in principle leaves states freedom to develop capacities for enrichment and reprocessing does not oblige them to use this freedom. They can – if they wish – accept limitations on it for longer or shorter periods of time.

• Undoubtedly with a view to creating mutual confidence, North and South Korea agreed in their Denuclearization Declaration of 1991 to forego the construction both of enrichment and reprocessing plants. The declaration may no longer have legal relevance but it provides an interesting precedent: states can agree between themselves to renounce some activities (in this case enrichment) that are open to them and that could be misused. They are obviously free to make them for a specified period of time. Although the legal effects arise only between the parties guarantees might be needed from third states of supply of fuel for nuclear power plants operated by the states.

• It would seem worth considering whether the states in the Middle East region might not find benefit it establishing a zone free not only of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and missiles but also of fuel cycle activities –  notably enrichment and reprocessing plants.

• Iran might initially respond that nothing could move the country from exercising its right under the NPT to make the full use of nuclear energy, including the right to a programme for the enrichment of uranium. It is true that Iran does not seem to have been tempted to abandon enrichment by offers of investments, support to become a member of WTO, assistance to expand its civilian nuclear power program, confirmation of the protection against armed attacks etc. The outside world has had and still has difficulty in understanding this rigid attachment to a programme that can hardly be economic and that can hardly ensure long term nuclear fuel independence. While many conclude that the ultimate aim of the program is to make a nuclear weapon or to make Iran a near nuclear weapon state, another explanation might be that continuation of the programme is more a matter of national pride rather than of assurance of supply of nuclear fuel.

• At the non-governmental level some experts starting from the premise that nothing could move Iran to abandon the enrichment program, have suggested acceptance of Iranian enrichment with maximum transparency, international inspection and perhaps international participation. While such arrangements could give reasonably early warning in case of an Iranian break out, it could not physically prevent it.  Inspectors could be thrown out and installations could be nationalized. While not without value such an arrangement would give the outside world limited confidence and it is not certain that it would be enough to discourage enrichment programs among neighbors.

• A zonal agreement that would oblige Iran to completely suspend its program for enrichment of uranium for a specific, rather long period of time, oblige other states in the region to forego enrichment for the same period and oblige Israel to do away with its nuclear weapons, stocks of fissionable material and production capacity, might be a different matter.  It would fit into Iran’s declared wish to promote nuclear disarmament. Having been accused of threatening non-proliferation and deserving isolation Iran would get the credit for helping to consolidate non-proliferation in the region and even helping to bring tangible and welcome nuclear disarmament.

• Israel would undoubtedly initially reject any suggestion that would remove a nuclear capacity that it regards as a life insurance. Israel’s ambition to remain the only nuclear weapon state in the region has been displayed through the attack on Osirak in 1981, the attack in 2007 on some Syrian installations and by the threat of attacks on Iranian installations. Is this deemed a sustainable approach or is it possible that Israel would consider the cost benefit better if the country took the cost of doing away with its own – not acknowledged – nuclear weapons and capacity to make such weapons and gained the benefit that no other states in the region would become even a near nuclear weapon state?

• There can be no illusions about the difficulties that would have to be solved in designing and getting agreement about a zone as suggested above. However, the difficulties might be even greater in the construction of a zone renouncing only the weapons – leaving the fuel cycle untouched.  It is implausible that Israel would go along with eliminating its nuclear weapons and leave Iranian enrichment untouched.

• Many problems would have to be overcome. The supply of required uranium fuel would have to be assured and guaranteed from the outside world. Arrangements for effective inspection going beyond  IAEA safeguards would have to be drawn up. Security guarantees would be needed. Steps by P 5 states toward nuclear disarmament would facilitate regional action. The exact geographical scope of a zone would need to be defined.

• The explicit object of the Helsinki meeting are ‘weapons’. The CWC has a definition of chemical weapons. The NPT does not define nuclear weapons.  Discussions before Helsinki should make it clear  that not only deployed nuclear weapons, but also non-deployed weapons, weapons ready material and installations to make the material should be covered in a zone agreement. It would seem politically inconceivable at the present time to focus on Israel’s nuclear weapons and forget Iran’s enrichment, and it would seem equally impossible to consider Iran’s growing enrichment and near nuclear weapon status and forgetting that Israel has hundreds of nuclear arms.

Part 1. What has happened to the nuclear disarmament spring?

Part 2. How serious is the threat for nuclear weapon?

Part 3. How to resolve the Iranian nuclear dilemma?

I am happy to have the opportunity to speak to so many experts on non-proliferation and disarmament and to see so many old friends. I must start, however, by joining those who have already expressed our sadness that one strong and intelligent voice is missing – Therese Delpech. We all respected her clear thinking and had great fondness for her. She was an upright and forceful member of the College of Commissioners of the UN inspection commission for Iraq.

I welcome a specifically European caucus on non-proliferation and disarmament. Of course, much of the thinking on these subjects is in common the world over. Nevertheless, we come with different experiences – even within the European Union. If we want the Union to be an important voice in the world, we need to discuss what that voice could and should say. For instance to Iran, very soon in Istanbul!

During the Cold War the Soviet Union was a common threat to the Euro-Atlantic community making united stands under US leadership natural in areas of non-proliferation and disarmament. The cohesion remains and US and European ambitions in this field have mostly continued in healthy harmony after the end of the Cold War. But there are also differences, for instance, on the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

Differences in outlooks became conspicuous during the unilateralism that blossomed under the Bush Jr administration. A famous line by Robert Kagan told us that Americans are from Mars and Europeans from Venus. Americans act and fight, Europeans – not least in the EU – talk endlessly.

If true, is it that after many centuries of war we – and the Russians, too – don’t have the stomach for more weapons and fighting? My personal conviction is that Europeans would still rally to armed action, if needed for self-defense, but they will do so also rarely and reluctantly in other cases – as in Libya.

Will European states today join in a war against Iran? In the Iraq war European governments joined to eradicate WMD that did not exist.     Are European governments ready now to join in the eradication of Iranian WMD intentions – that may or may not exist?  I have no doubt that most Europeans would wish Iran to stop uranium enrichment and condemn wild and populist statements about wiping Israel off the map, but Iran has not launched an attack on anybody, nor does any attack seem imminent, nor will the Security Council authorize armed force.

Although it is true as has been said that international law is not necessarily the top consideration when wars are begun we must be aware that armed action now against Iran would not be pre-emptive but preventive and in disregard of the UN Charter.

I doubt that the Obama administration or Pentagon wants a third war – a preventive war—in the Middle East. I feel less sure about the still significant forces in the US that favoured the unipolar world and shared the attitudes of Mr. Kagan. The difference between those attitudes and the European views were well reflected in declarations from 2003.

In the European Security Strategy of 12 December 2003 I find the following statement:

“…The fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations Charter. The United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European priority.”

In the same year’s Basic Principles for a EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, I find it stated that

“The best solution to the problem of proliferation of WMD is that countries should no longer feel they need them. If possible, political solutions should be found to the problems which lead them to seek WMD.”

In the US National Defense Strategy of 2005, I read:

“The end of the cold war and our capacity to influence global events open the prospects for a new and peaceful system in the world.”

In that same year leading political figures in the US left no doubt they thought the UN was useless. An article by Newt Gingrich, now a presidential candidate, had the title: “A limited UN is best for America”. The article made clear that ‘failure’ was not an option for the US but could be for the UN.  [IHT 13 Sept 2005].

Even though President Obama did not mention the UN in his recent State of the Union message he lost no time after his election in 2008 to bring US government back to positive attitudes to multilateral cooperation, to the UN and to agreements on arms control and disarmament.

Europe and the world were enthusiastic, when Obama and Medvedev met in London and declared that they wished to put the Cold War definitively in the past and even supported the aim of a complete elimination of nuclear weapons. We remember Obama’s speeches in Prague and Cairo, the relative success of the NPT review conference in 2010.

We do not doubt the continued wish of the Obama administration to tackle more issues on the disarmament agenda and I am sure Europe welcomes many steps actually taken by it, most recently for instance, regarding a Code of Conduct for Space Faring Nations. However, we are bound to note that the ratification process for START in the US Senate showed the difficulty to get any proposal for arms control/disarmament through that body. This, of course, is what currently stops the CTBT.

We are also bound to note that as the global superpower the US has wider security and military interests than European states, for instance, in the non-proliferation problem of North East Asia, a matter interesting but hardly engaging the EU. The union has been termed ‘a constructive bystander’.

While recognizing that the US must tailor the size and composition of its military might to cope with interests over the whole world, one may query

if the size of the US defense budget – even after proposed cuts – is not excessive. It cannot be explained by the need adequately to meet what we are often told is the greatest threat to US and world security, a threat we are not inclined to belittle – namely, nuclear proliferation and terrorism.

As the US seems to be practically writing off the risk of a military conflict with Russia, must we not conclude that it is concern about the rise of China  and the ever present influence of a powerful military-industrial complex that  lead both to the huge budget and to skepticism about restrictions in the field of arms control and disarmament? Regrettably, the size may be triggering an undesirable expansion of defense budgets in several other countries.

European governments are not, however, in this category. They do not have the same wide interest as the US and are not subjected to quite the same pressure as the US government. They govern in countries tired of war and weapons expenses. Some of them have nearly shelved the idea of territorial defense. Most European states allocate less than 2 % of their GNP to military expenses and are basically unsympathetic to expenses for armament and basically positive to arms control and disarmament.

The lone US superpower that remains ready so far to pay dearly to retain its global military supremacy clearly looks with some dismay at us Europeans. Before leaving his post as US Secretary of Defense, the level headed Mr. Gates warned NATO allies about spending too little on defense and said that future American generations might ‘turn away from spending so much to defend its wealthy allies in Europe.’ I imagine many Europeans would simply ask ‘defend against whom’?

US naval deployments in Asia – Pacific and the Middle East is increasing much and – largely – beyond direct European interests and influence. I see new US ‘containment policy’ developed toward China. Many Europeans may have some doubts about this policy and regret some of its cost. Some who are concerned about proliferation were dismayed about the exception for India that the US pushed through the Nuclear Suppliers Group to secure its nuclear alliance with India. They may now feel that Pakistan’s current blocking of the Conference of Disarmament and of the negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut Off has been a sad result.

Personally, I would only hope that this traditionalist US balance of power policy will be accompanied by a policy of inclusion and regard for legitimate Chinese interests. There is some risk otherwise of an arms race in the region. The absence of an FMCT could also trigger a sad nuclear race – involving India, Pakistan and China.  No doubt China, on her part, could also contribute to détente. Questions relating to Taiwan and to the border with India call for prudence.  Many differences in the Far East relate to maritime borders and small islands – like the Spratleys. It would be a very good thing if all, including China, rather than relying on their negotiating power agreed to refer differences of this kind to the International Court of Justice or other judicial settlement,  as many European states have done.

Let me conclude by reverting to relations with Russia. It was the termination of the massive Soviet military threat over 20 years ago that opened up for an era of détente and disarmament in the world.  A wave of welcome actions rolled in during the first half of the 1990s. The new wave that we saw coming in 2009 and 2010 stagnated last year. It will require prudent policies by the biggest military powers to handle the risks of nuclear proliferation in North East Asia and in the Middle East and to handle their own interrelations to allow this wave to resume its force. MED – mutual economic dependence – rather than familiar MAD – fear of mutual assured destruction – may help to prompt such prudence.

Europe is not the main actor in this new act of the drama but it still has an important part to play, not least to help consolidate good relations with Russia. As I said earlier I think the US has largely and rightly written off the risk of war with Russia. Despite some qualms caused by the uncertain movement toward democracy in Russia, the US seeks to complete this historical turn. A ‘reset’ is sought to remove irritants, achieve détente, positive cooperation on Afghanistan, Iran, North Korea and a further reduction in nuclear arsenals beyond START. In all these ambitions European states are supportive.

The result so far has been mixed. At long last Russia has been eased into the WTO. Russia is allowing militarily US transports to Afghanistan. On the other hand the Russian intervention in Ossetia and what was in part an overreaction to it shows that we need further training in good neighbourly relations on the European continent. It is a pity that entry into force of the amendments to the CFE remains blocked and that NATO has not yet agreed to remove militarily useless tactical nuclear weapons from Europe.

More serious is that a follow up on the 2010 START is blocked. The shield against intermediate range missiles poisons the atmosphere. I confess the controversy puzzles me. I do not understand the Russian demand for a legally binding declaration that the shield will not be used against Russia. What real assurance could be gained from paper guarantees? I also do not understand why the shield should be necessary. Are Europeans really worried – or should we be worried — about a threat of missile attacks from Iran and North Korea? Would not the prospect of solid retaliation suffice to deter any temptation in North Korea or Iran to attack Europe?

Fellow talkative citizens from Venus!  Let us raise our glasses to our continued discussions and to our new European caucus on non-proliferation and disarmament!

The Iranian Nuclear Dilemma: Risk of an Iraq Sequel?

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As delivered

Global Zero has been dedicated and successful in building much popular commitment for nuclear disarmament and it is striking that the list of supporters comprise a very large number of former ministers in many countries.  It is also welcome and encouraging that Presidents Obama and Medvedev and the SG of the UN support the aim of Global Zero.

I am confident that in the long run not only Global Zero nuclear weapons but also broad disarmament of which nuclear disarmament is a part will become a reality. The main reason is that whatever stabilizing effect, if any, MAD – mutually assured destruction – might have had, stability and peace today is increasingly supplied by MED – mutual economic dependence.

Globalization is not without problems, but it does force most states to pay attention to the concerns of states on which they are dependent. Hence, I am optimistic. My optimism is further underpinned by the awareness that there are no border or territorial conflicts between the biggest states and no ideological conflict between them – as there was during the Cold War.

However, my optimism for the long term is not matched by one for the short term. At the moment there is an intermission in the field of disarmament. The financial crisis and unemployment are the sad big items on the global agenda. The democratic uprisings in the Arab world do engage us and rightly get attention as something truly important, but both disarmament and global warming are right now below governments’ political horizons.

It is as if the entry into force of the START with its modest but important reductions in deployed nuclear warheads and weapons carriers had exhausted all political energy. One might have thought that NATO tactical nuclear weapons in Europe and Russian tactical nuclear weapons in the West should have been like low hanging fruit to be removed, but NO! They are stuck! Further, the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva seems to be going into a second decade of coma, paralyzed by a rule of consensus that could perhaps be understood when it had 18 members but is now absurd. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is not yet in force. The important Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty is in limbo and negotiations with the DPRK and Iran do not seem to move forward… Armament goes on in a great many countries. The annual military expenses globally are some 1.600 billion dollars. This at a time when we are not able to scrape together 100 billion annually to make a package to counter global warming. Why is this?

It is striking that a large number of veteran civilian statesmen seem convinced that after the end of the Cold War nuclear deterrence is obsolete or obsolescent. I am thinking of the famous American four – Shultz, Kissinger, Perry and Nunn – but also of four famous Russians – Primakov, Ivanov, Velikhov and Moissev. They all advocate nuclear disarmament and they have a big following in the world.

Yet, many security thinkers in the military, in defense ministries and parliaments warn against lowering the military readiness and budgets. While declaring that the main threat today are rogue states and terrorists they still prevail in budgeting for new air craft carriers, submarines, superbombers and space fighting capacity  designed for ever more improbable  big power war.  This way, budget deficits are exacerbated by military expenditures that remain at levels which were understandable during the Cold War – but not now.

Paradoxically, the absurdity of this level of armaments and expenditures may provoke something hopeful!  The tax payers – not least in the US – are tired of war.  If they see no major real threats they will turn against current levels of armaments – especially nuclear. We have seen this tendency in Europe and we now see the first signs of it in the US. Perhaps the ministers of finance will join the wishes of the taxpayers and become ministers of disarmament?

I must add something important.  I am not suggesting that full solutions of regional differences are indispensable to a reduction in armaments. But the executive branches of government in the biggest states need to pursue foreign policies that strengthen détente between themselves. There is much each of them can do.  A main key lies in the US. I agree with the questioning of the need for the US-NATO proposed missile shield. Whatever protection it could give ­– if any – against a threat from Iran would be outweighed by damaged relations with Russia.  – Russia could develop policies of good neighbour with the Baltic and other states. China and its neighbours could seek to resolve many differences in the South China Sea and elsewhere by arbitration or judicial settlements before the International Court of Justice.

Lastly, I agree about the need to influence public opinion – not least students. No one has done more in this regard than Global Zero.