Some thoughts by Hans Blix in April 2012 in view of the meeting planned to take place at Helsinki in 2012:

A Middle East Zone free of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles for their delivery. Some thoughts by Hans Blix in April 2012 in view of the meeting  planned to take place at Helsinki in 2012.

• At this time – April 2012 – the question relating to the Iranian program for the enrichment of uranium is so hot that a discussion of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East may seem like distant dreaming.  A meeting between Iran and the P5+1 (or EU3+3) is  expected later this month and it must be hoped that it will bring some easing of the acute tension and less talk of possible military action. Considering the rigid postures the meeting can hardly be expected to bring drastic rapprochement. While declaring that it is ready to discuss the ‘nuclear issue’ Iran continues to hold that it will under no circumstances forego its program of enrichment. Some of the P 5  on the other hand, keep repeating that a ‘window of opportunity’ remains open for Iran only for a short while more, suggesting that they demand substantial early Iranian concessions on the enrichment issue while not  describing any concessions they would be ready to make.

• Positions are often rigid in advance of meetings. If on this occasion the various parties have any conciliatory cards, they might prefer to keep them up their sleeves at this stage. From the US side there have only been some suggestions that after a settlement of the controversy and restoration of confidence enrichment in Iran might be envisaged long term. The Russian government has talked about a ‘step by step’ approach. It has not been rejected by Iran, but the steps do not appear to have been defined. There have also been suggestions to build on earlier schemes concerning the supply of 20 % enriched uranium fuel.

• Whatever may happen in the controversy in the near future it is incumbent upon the governments concerned in the Middle East region and non-governmental institutions in the region to give thought to the subject that the 2010 NPT Review Conference singled out for a meeting – a Middle East Zone free of weapons of mass destruction and missiles to deliver them.

• Some things have already happened relating to this conference but many issues need to be clarified and agreed before the meeting.  Helsinki has been chosen as the venue and a Finnish diplomat has been appointed ‘facilitator’. The date of the conference seems likely to be toward the end of December.

• The list of participants and the agenda need be agreed in advance or else these matters could derail the conference at the outset. As we know from agreements about other weapon free zones, it is above all the countries that form the region and that are ready to make commitments that should be present. In the case of the Middle East, the selection of most candidates for participation will not raise questions. In some cases there may be discussion.

• Turkey has not traditionally been seen as a part of the Middle East. Yet, as a state aspiring to use nuclear power and with significant influence in the area its active participation in the conference – and potentially in a zone — could be practically important. Its membership in the NATO alliance could be a complicating factor. A possible zone commitment to be free of nuclear weapons would hardly be incompatible with NATO guarantees of protection against nuclear attacks (‘nuclear umbrella). Even though the hosting of nuclear weapons under NATO has not been judged incompatible with the obligations under the NPT the hosting of such weapons in a nuclear weapon free zone could be a different matter. The idea of moving all NATO nuclear weapons to US territory is under active discussion within the alliance but no decision has yet been taken on the issue.

• To most observers and commentators it has been almost axiomatic that the meeting demanded by the 2010 NPT Review Conference must have the participation of both Iran and Israel. It is true that a zone agreement in which either of these countries is missing would have limited meaning. However, this is not the same as saying that the absence of one or both of these states at the meeting would deprive it of meaning. Indeed, making the holding the meeting dependent upon their participation would be to make it hostage to conditions that either of them could advance. It might be wiser for the states that are prima facie interested  in and positive to creating a zone agree to meet and consider lines of agreement that they consider possible and desirable, leaving it to relevant states that might have chosen to stay outside the meeting to consider under what conditions or with what modification they might join the project.

• At the present time it is not known whether Israel and Iran are ready to participate in the meeting. In the case of Israel a positive response might look like a conciliatory gesture in the controversy with Iran and this would hardly be consistent with the impression that the Israeli government wants to create of a readiness to launch an armed attack against Iran. In the case of Iran, declining participation in the conference would seem difficult, considering that Iran does not have nuclear weapons, that it declares a strongly positive attitude to global nuclear disarmament and sees the possession of nuclear weapons as  incompatible with its religious faith and principles. Iran would, indeed, have a chance to take the high moral ground and propose a zone in which all states in the region, including Iran itself and Israel, renounced both weapons and fuel cycle activities and highly effective inspection. However. Iran might not take this chance. It could even decline participation, if Israel were to stay away or if the agenda were to open for discussion of zonal conditions demanding the absence not only of deployable weapons but also of stocks of fissile material and installations for the production of such material.

• The absence of either Israel or Iran from the conference would have some significant drawbacks but would also eliminate road blocks. It might be assumed that in any negotiation of zonal commitments, Israel would strive to make the realization of a zone dependent upon a Middle East peace agreement, while Iran might strive to leave all fuel cycle activities unregulated. Neither posture would help the search for early accommodation and compromise.

• Whatever the participation in the Helsinki conference, it would seem important that likeminded regional states that do not have the strong vested interests that characterize Israel and Iran get together and define on what lines the zone should be built – taking into reasonable account the interest of Israel and Iran as they see them and understand them. While initiatives and pressures by outsiders might well be negatively perceived, regional states that neither have nuclear weapons nor fuel cycle activities might stand a somewhat better chance of finding lines that are acceptable to themselves and take into account the security and other interests of all in the region.

• The Gulf States and the Gulf States Council would be well placed to take on this delicate role that would require intense consultations in the relatively short period before the Helsinki conference, as well as during and after the conference.

• It has been rightly noted by many commentators that the conference in Helsinki should not be seen as a one time event. Indeed, it is likely to be convoked for a rather short period of time – perhaps a week or even less. This would hardly be more than what is needed for the launching of some ideas and agreement to explore them in further meetings.

• What concept of a zone free of nuclear weapons (leaving for the moment the other wmd and missiles aside)  could be contemplated? We do not start with a blank page but must look back.

• The idea of a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East was  advanced by Iran and Egypt in 1974 in the General Assembly of the UN. It has been on the table since then and even had consensus  support.  However, while registering its support Israel has always stated that such a zone can only materialize when peace has been established in the region.

• Originally, the zone concept was clearly rooted in the view that Israel should be brought into the wave of regional states that renounced nuclear weapons.

• Like the NPT a zonal treaty aims at eliminating nuclear items. However, it may differ in several respects from the NPT, apart from the geographical limitation. The NPT becomes binding for each state as it adheres, irrespective of what other states do. All Arab states and Iran and Turkey have adhered to the NPT and are bound by it but Israel has not adhered, is not bound and is assumed to have many nuclear weapons.

• The entry into force for a zonal treaty can – as in the Tlatelolco Treaty – be made dependent upon all parties in a specific geographic region adhering. It can also contain many different features that do not figure in the NPT. It may have systems of verification that differ from or go beyond traditional IAEA inspection, for instance, allow parties challenge inspections, allow national inspectors to participate in the verification process etc.  It could also create a legal basis for active cooperation in the development and use of nuclear energy, for instance regarding jointly owned nuclear reactors for the generation of power or the desalination of water or for the disposal sites for nuclear waste.

• While the zonal treaty for the Middle East has been on the international agenda for a long time, what has lately propelled it into much attention has less to do with Israel’s weapons than with the concern that Iran is developing a fuel cycle program, including the construction and operation of plants for the enrichment of uranium. Although Iran, itself, denies any intention to make nuclear weapons, some suspect that this is the intention. Whatever the reality, the program is making Iran a ‘near nuclear weapon state’ and it is feared that other states in the region may emulate Iran’s example, which will raise the tension.

• It is true, as often underlined by Iran that the NPT raises no obstacles to states that want to build fuel cycle installations for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Japan that had over 50 nuclear power plants operating has both enrichment and reprocessing plants linked to this large peaceful nuclear power capacity. Brazil with only a few nuclear power plants has also developed a capacity to enrich uranium. Unlike Iran neither Japan, nor Brazil have met international objections.

• It is clear that there would be little support in the international community for any international agreement – whether a separate convention or an amendment to the NPT – under which states would renounce enrichment or reprocessing activities (perhaps for a specific period of time) in the interest of avoiding that any one becomes a ‘near nuclear weapon state’. States like Canada, Australia, Namibia,  South Africa or Jordan with large uranium resources ore might want at least to keep the option open of not only mining the energy raw material but also of enriching it for export sales.

• At the same time there is understandable skepticism against a wide-spread  construction of fuel cycle installations in the world, especially as the global capacity for enrichment and reprocessing seems ample to respond to needs expected in the near future. Every petrol consuming nation does not need an oil refinery of its own and every state using uranium as fuel for nuclear power reactors does not need an enrichment plant of its own.

• It is also clear that enrichment – or reprocessing –  plants in sensitive regions or without rigid control and international participation and/or supervision may be likely to raise concern and even suspicion. The NPT that in principle leaves states freedom to develop capacities for enrichment and reprocessing does not oblige them to use this freedom. They can – if they wish – accept limitations on it for longer or shorter periods of time.

• Undoubtedly with a view to creating mutual confidence, North and South Korea agreed in their Denuclearization Declaration of 1991 to forego the construction both of enrichment and reprocessing plants. The declaration may no longer have legal relevance but it provides an interesting precedent: states can agree between themselves to renounce some activities (in this case enrichment) that are open to them and that could be misused. They are obviously free to make them for a specified period of time. Although the legal effects arise only between the parties guarantees might be needed from third states of supply of fuel for nuclear power plants operated by the states.

• It would seem worth considering whether the states in the Middle East region might not find benefit it establishing a zone free not only of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and missiles but also of fuel cycle activities –  notably enrichment and reprocessing plants.

• Iran might initially respond that nothing could move the country from exercising its right under the NPT to make the full use of nuclear energy, including the right to a programme for the enrichment of uranium. It is true that Iran does not seem to have been tempted to abandon enrichment by offers of investments, support to become a member of WTO, assistance to expand its civilian nuclear power program, confirmation of the protection against armed attacks etc. The outside world has had and still has difficulty in understanding this rigid attachment to a programme that can hardly be economic and that can hardly ensure long term nuclear fuel independence. While many conclude that the ultimate aim of the program is to make a nuclear weapon or to make Iran a near nuclear weapon state, another explanation might be that continuation of the programme is more a matter of national pride rather than of assurance of supply of nuclear fuel.

• At the non-governmental level some experts starting from the premise that nothing could move Iran to abandon the enrichment program, have suggested acceptance of Iranian enrichment with maximum transparency, international inspection and perhaps international participation. While such arrangements could give reasonably early warning in case of an Iranian break out, it could not physically prevent it.  Inspectors could be thrown out and installations could be nationalized. While not without value such an arrangement would give the outside world limited confidence and it is not certain that it would be enough to discourage enrichment programs among neighbors.

• A zonal agreement that would oblige Iran to completely suspend its program for enrichment of uranium for a specific, rather long period of time, oblige other states in the region to forego enrichment for the same period and oblige Israel to do away with its nuclear weapons, stocks of fissionable material and production capacity, might be a different matter.  It would fit into Iran’s declared wish to promote nuclear disarmament. Having been accused of threatening non-proliferation and deserving isolation Iran would get the credit for helping to consolidate non-proliferation in the region and even helping to bring tangible and welcome nuclear disarmament.

• Israel would undoubtedly initially reject any suggestion that would remove a nuclear capacity that it regards as a life insurance. Israel’s ambition to remain the only nuclear weapon state in the region has been displayed through the attack on Osirak in 1981, the attack in 2007 on some Syrian installations and by the threat of attacks on Iranian installations. Is this deemed a sustainable approach or is it possible that Israel would consider the cost benefit better if the country took the cost of doing away with its own – not acknowledged – nuclear weapons and capacity to make such weapons and gained the benefit that no other states in the region would become even a near nuclear weapon state?

• There can be no illusions about the difficulties that would have to be solved in designing and getting agreement about a zone as suggested above. However, the difficulties might be even greater in the construction of a zone renouncing only the weapons – leaving the fuel cycle untouched.  It is implausible that Israel would go along with eliminating its nuclear weapons and leave Iranian enrichment untouched.

• Many problems would have to be overcome. The supply of required uranium fuel would have to be assured and guaranteed from the outside world. Arrangements for effective inspection going beyond  IAEA safeguards would have to be drawn up. Security guarantees would be needed. Steps by P 5 states toward nuclear disarmament would facilitate regional action. The exact geographical scope of a zone would need to be defined.

• The explicit object of the Helsinki meeting are ‘weapons’. The CWC has a definition of chemical weapons. The NPT does not define nuclear weapons.  Discussions before Helsinki should make it clear  that not only deployed nuclear weapons, but also non-deployed weapons, weapons ready material and installations to make the material should be covered in a zone agreement. It would seem politically inconceivable at the present time to focus on Israel’s nuclear weapons and forget Iran’s enrichment, and it would seem equally impossible to consider Iran’s growing enrichment and near nuclear weapon status and forgetting that Israel has hundreds of nuclear arms.